There are at least three motives for us to investigate team reasoning. It provides a development of game theory which arguably better captures the notion of rational choice in many ordinary social interactions. It promises to provide an explanation of how there could be aggregate subjects. And it might provide an account of shared intention.
Team reasoning can be drawn on in attempting, perhaps not always successfully, to provide:
an account of rational decision which differs from plain vanilla game theory on what is rational in many ordinary social interactions which have the structure of games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma1 and Hi-Lo1 (Bacharach, 2006; Sugden, 2000)
aggregate subject : A subject whose proper parts are themselves subjects. A paradigm example would be a Portuguese man o' war (Physalia physalis), which is an animal that can swim and eat and whose swimming and eating is not simply a matter of the swimming or eating of its constituent animals. Distinct from, but sometimes confused with, a plural subject.
shared intention : An attitude that stands to joint action as ordinary, individual intention stands to ordinary, individual action. It is hard to find consensus on what shared intention is, but most agree that it is neither shared nor intention. (Variously called ‘collective’, ‘we-’ and ‘joint’ intention.)
team reasoning : ‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it’ (Bacharach, 2006, p. 121).