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Question Session 06

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principle of possibilities : ‘We understand what an entity is with reference to [...] the set of possibilities we infer it came from’ (Clark, 1992, p. 367).
The Problem of Action : What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (According to Frankfurt (1978, p. 157), ‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him.’)


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Clark, H. H. (1992). Arenas of Language Use. University of Chicago Press.
Dixson, H. G. W., Komugabe-Dixson, A. F., Dixson, B. J., & Low, J. (2018). Scaling Theory of Mind in a Small-Scale Society: A Case Study From Vanuatu. Child Development, 89(6), 2157–2175.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157–162.
Hommel, B. (2017). Consciousness and Action Control. In T. Egner (Ed.), The wiley handbook of cognitive control (pp. 111–123). Wiley.
Schlosser, M. (2019). Dual-System Theory and the Role of Consciousness in Intentional Action. Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience, 35–56.
Steward, H. (2009). Animal Agency. Inquiry, 52(3), 217–231.
Wassmann, J., Funke, J., & Träuble, B. (2013). Theory of mind in the Pacific: Reasoning across cultures. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter.
Witzel, C., & Gegenfurtner, K. R. (2018). Color Perception: Objects, Constancy, and Categories. Annual Review of Vision Science, 4(1), 475–499.