Question Session 04
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Causal Theory of Action
: According to this view, an event is action ‘just in case it has a certain sort of psychological cause’ (Bach, 1978, p. 361).
: The kind of representation characteristically involved in preparing, performing and monitoring sequences of small-scale actions such as grasping, transporting and placing an object. They represent actual, possible, imagined or observed actions and their effects.
The Problem of Action
: What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (According to Frankfurt (1978, p. 157), ‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him.’)
Bach, K. (1978). A representational theory of action. Philosophical Studies
(4), 361–379. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364703
Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly
Keramati, M., Smittenaar, P., Dolan, R. J., & Dayan, P. (2016). Adaptive integration of habits into depth-limited planning defines a habitual-goaldirected spectrum. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
(45), 12868–12873. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1609094113
Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework. Cognition
(1), 179–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003