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From Team Reasoning to Shared Intention

Does reflection on team reasoning enable us to understand shared intention and therefore joint action. In this section introduces Pacherie (2013)’s proposal. And highlights four questions for proponents of team-reasoning based accounts of shared intention.

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Notes

Prerequisites

This section depends on you having studied some sections from a previous lecture:

Sources for Further Research

Gold & Sugden (2007) give an account of shared intention involving team reasoning. (Roughly, shared intentions are ordinary individual intentions; the difference is just that the shared intentions are formed as a consequence of team reasoning.)

Pacherie (2013) gives an alternative account of shared intention involving team reasoning.

Gold & Sugden (2007) and Pacherie (2013) both offer objections to Bratman on Shared Intentional Action.

Bratman (1985, p. 96) replies to Gold & Sugden (2007)’s objection (do read the footnotes, that’s where much of the substance is).

On what might prompt agents to engage in team reasoning, Hindriks (2012) critically discusses both Bacharach’s and Sugden’s different views.

Bermúdez (2020, p. 188ff) offers ‘two very significant difficulties for Bacharach’s theory’ of team reasoning. This discussion is not directly relevant to Gold & Sugden (2007) and Pacherie (2013).

Other Approaches to Joint Action

There are a wide range of other approaches to characterising joint action which are not covered in these lectures but are relevant to the syllabus.

Gilbert (1990); Gilbert (2013) develops an alternative to Bratman based on her notion of joint commitment.

It may be that Tuomela & Miller (1988) and Searle (1990)’s response initiated contemporary debate. (Brooks (1981) does not appear to have been considered.)

Many philosophers agree that distinguishing acting jointly from acting in parallel but merely individually involves invoking states of the agents who are acting jointly, often dubbed ‘we-’, ‘shared’ or ‘collective intentions’ Some hold that the states in question involve a novel attitude (Searle, 1990; Gallotti & Frith, 2013). Others have explored the notion that the primary distinguishing feature of these states is not the kind of attitude involved but rather the kind of subject, which is plural (Helm, 2008). Or they may differ from ordinary intentions in involving distinctive obligations or commitments to others (Gilbert, 1992; Roth, 2004).

No all philosophers invoke shared intention to explicate joint action. Petersson (2007, p. 138), for instance, attempts to explicate the distinction between acting jointly and acting in parallel but merely individually ‘in terms of dispositions and causal agency’. See also Chant (2007, p. ][) for another alternative line.

Miller (2001) is unusual in focussing first on ends (which I label goals) rather than starting with some kind of intention or other mental state.

Ludwig (2007); Ludwig (2016) offers a distinctive approach based on semantic analysis. Although this is sometimes viewed as a variant of Bratman’s theory, Ludwig and Bratman probably disagree on fundamental issues about what a theory of joint action is supposed to achieve. Helpfully, Ludwig (2015) has discussed Bratman.

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Glossary

goal : A goal of an action is an outcome to which it is directed.
shared intention : An attitude that stands to joint action as ordinary, individual intention stands to ordinary, individual action. It is hard to find consensus on what shared intention is, but most agree that it is neither shared nor intention. (Variously called ‘collective’, ‘we-’ and ‘joint’ intention.)
team reasoning : ‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it’ (Bacharach, 2006, p. 121).

References

Bacharach, M. (2006). Beyond individual choice. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved from http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b3272720~S1
Bermúdez, J. L. (2020). Frame It Again: New Tools for Rational Decision-Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108131827
Bratman, M. E. (1985). Davidson’s theory of intention. In B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka (Eds.), Essays on davidson: Actions and events (pp. 13–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brooks, D. H. M. (1981). Joint action. Mind, 90(357), 113–119. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253670
Chant, S. R. (2007). Unintentional collective action. Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action, 10(3), 245. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790701535246
Gallotti, M., & Frith, C. D. (2013). Social cognition in the we-mode. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(4), 160–165. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.02.002
Gilbert, M. P. (1990). Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15, 1–14.
Gilbert, M. P. (1992). On social facts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gilbert, M. P. (2013). Joint commitment: How we make the social world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199970148.001.0001
Gold, N., & Sugden, R. (2007). Collective intentions and team agency. Journal of Philosophy, 104(3), 109–137.
Helm, B. W. (2008). Plural agents. Nous, 42(1), 17–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00672.x
Hindriks, F. (2012). Team reasoning and group identification. Rationality and Society, 24(2), 198–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463111429274
Ludwig, K. (2007). Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics. Nous, 41(3), 355–393. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00652.x
Ludwig, K. (2015). Shared agency in modest sociality. Journal of Social Ontology, 1(1), 7–15. Retrieved from http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jso.2015.1.issue-1/jso-2014-0046/jso-2014-0046.xml
Ludwig, K. (2016). From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action. Oxford University Press.
Miller, S. (2001). Social action: A teleological account (p. 324). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pacherie, E. (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(2), 173–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5
Pacherie, E. (2013). Intentional joint agency: Shared intention lite. Synthese, 190(10), 1817–1839. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0263-7
Petersson, B. (2007). Collectivity and circularity. Journal of Philosophy, 104(3), 138–156.
Roth, A. S. (2004). Shared agency and contralateral commitments. The Philosophical Review, 113(3), 359–410.
Searle, J. R. (1990). Collective intentions and actions. In P. Cohen, J. Morgan, & M. E. Pollack (Eds.), Intentions in communication (pp. 90–105). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sugden, R. (2000). Team preferences. Economics and Philosophy, 16, 175–204.
Tuomela, R., & Miller, K. (1988). We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53(3), 367–389. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353512