In this part of the course we begin discussion of decision theory (this week) game theory (next week). We will eventually relate these to philosophical issues and psychological discovieres about individual and joint action.

Notes

This lecture depends on you having studied some sections from a previous lecture:

decision theory : I use ‘decision theory’ for the theory elaborated by Jeffrey (1983). Variants are variously called ‘expected utility theory’ (Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis, 2004), ‘revealed preference theory’ (Sen, 1973) and ‘the theory of rational choice’ (Sugden, 1991). As the differences between variants are not important for our purposes, the term can be used for any of core formal parts of the standard approaches based on Ramsey (1931) and Savage (1972).

Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The logic of decision, second edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Neumann, J. von, Morgenstern, O., Rubinstein, A., & Kuhn, H. W. (1953). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, N.J. ; Woodstock: Princeton University Press.

Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A. (1994). A course in game theory. MIT press.

Ramsey, F. (1931). Truth and probability. In R. Braithwaite (Ed.), The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays. London: Routledge.

Rasmusen, E. (2007). Games and information: An introduction to game theory (4th ed). Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

Savage, L. J. (1972). The foundations of statistics (2nd rev. ed). New York: Dover Publications.

Sugden, R. (1991). Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy. The Economic Journal, 101(407), 751–785. https://doi.org/10.2307/2233854

Tadelis, S. (2013). Game theory: An introduction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.